Comments on ‘Arguing ‘for’ the Patient. Informed Consent and Strategic Maneuvering in Doctor–Patient Interaction’ by Bart Garssen
Comments on ‘Arguing ‘for’ the Patient. Informed
Consent and Strategic Maneuvering
in Doctor–Patient Interaction’
Bart Garssen
Published online: 25 April 2008
 The Author(s) 2008
Schulz and Rubinelli’s project ‘Informed consent and strategic maneuvering in
doctor–patient interaction’ provides an excellent opportunity for studying argu-
mentation in a specific institutional context because a medical consultation is a
special communicative activity type that may involve argumentative discussion.
Before engaging in empirical research regarding such a consultation it is necessary
to make a conceptional analysis of this type of doctor–patient interaction. One first
needs to give a general characterization of the type of interaction concerned: what is
the structure of the interaction in a doctor–patient consultation in terms of speech
acts, role taking and time constraints? For doing so a better understanding is
required of the type of difference of opinion that will be at issue in such a
consultation. What type of standpoint initiates the discussion? Which parts can be
distinguished in the activity type of medical consultation and which of them are
typically or potentially argumentative? What are the roles of the two participants in
each of these cases? Is it the doctor or the patient who initiates the discussion by
putting forward a standpoint or can this be done by either of them?
Schulz and Rubinelli characterize doctor–patient interaction as an ‘info-suasive
dialogue.’ This characterization is, however, problematic. The authors claim that the
interaction partly can be seen as an instance of an information-seeking dialogue and
partly an argumentative encounter, ‘at a higher level.’ But in a consultation
argumentation is not necessarily required. The patient may be in complete
agreement with everything the doctor says and the doctor may not expect the patient
to disagree with him so that no anticipation of doubt is necessary. Since
argumentation is not a constitutive part of this activity type it is not automatically
a ‘persuasive’ type of dialogue. Of course the moment one the parties has reason to
believe that the other party is not or will not be in full agreement with him,
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the doctor–patient encounter may be considered part of an argumentative
discussion. On the other hand, this activity type is neither a purely information-
seeking dialogue, because in the interaction, more is at stake than just information
seeking (as in an interview): the doctor may have to come to a decision about the
diagnosis and may have to explain this decision to the patient, etcetera.
Schulz and Rubinelli mention some problems or constraints they see as obstacles to
the conduct of a critical discussion and are of the opinion that they ‘favor the
dominance of rhetorical components in the doctor–patient interaction.’ The first
problem relates to the freedom rule. Unlike in a legal context, Schulz and Rubinelli
observe that in a medical encounter there is no clear conflict. This, however, is by no
means the most salient difference between legal argumentation and doctor–patient
argumentation. Argumentation is a constituent part of the legal process while in a
medical consultation argumentation is not a necessary component. Only when a doctor
is faced with doubt he may feel obliged to defend his claim and the same goes for the
patient. But this does not automatically means that the difference of opinion is unclear.
In some cases, the difference of opinion may become apparent because the doctor or
the patient explicitly expresses a standpoint. In other cases, the different of opinion may
not be so clearly defined because one of the parties just anticipates doubt and provides
argumentation in anticipation of such doubt. In this case, it is harder to interpret the
utterance as argumentation because it may be just an explanation. It could even a
strategic move to present the argumentation as if it were merely an explanation.
In view of an adequate reconstruction of the confrontation stage it is important to
know in what part of the consultation the standpoint is put forward: is the doctor
talking about the diagnosis, about the prognosis or about the desired treatment of the
problem? In all of these matters, the patient may have doubt about what the doctor
has to say. Whether the patient dares to voice his doubt is, of course, a different
matter. Even though the diagnosis is based on a doctor’s expertise, a conflict about
its outcome may arise. This happens, for instance, when a patient complains of
headaches and the doctor says this pain is clearly stress-related pain, while the
patient goes saying that he suffers from nausea as well and adds: ‘could this not be
something more serious than just stress?’
If the difference of opinion concerns a matter of treatment, a conflict may arise
more easily. When in the context of ‘informed consent’ a doctor justifies his
decision concerning the proposed therapy and the patient has not expressed doubt at
all, we may take it all the same that he anticipates doubt and tries to justify his
choice of treatment. In this way, knowledge of the activity type helps us to
reconstruct the difference of opinion, even though this difference of opinion has not
been made explicit. It is important, however, to realize that even in the context of
‘informed consent’ argumentation is not absolutely necessary.
Second, Schulz and Rubinelli point at problems pertaining to the burden of proof
rule. According to Schultz and Rubinelli, the verification of this condition in the
medical encounter is difficult because in the doctor’s view, the clinical reasons for
achieving a certain decision may be too technical to be used in argumentation. This
situation may cause the doctor to violate the burden of proof rule, when the doctor
simply refuses to back up his point of view, but this is not an automatic outcome. If the
doctor still intends to discuss the matter, it is more likely that he will resort to
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argumentation based on authority, referring to his experiences with similar cases—or
he may try to simplify the matter. This does not automatically involve a burden of
proof problem. It is clear that in this particular activity type, because of time constraints
and because of the unequal distribution of power, there will be certain limits as to the
obligations of a doctor to defend his claims to the full satisfaction of the patient.
A third problem mentioned by Schulz and Rubinelli has to do with the argument
scheme rule. Schulz and Rubinelli claim that the distinction between what is a
normatively good or poor argument in medical encounters has not yet been addressed.
According to the authors authority argumentation is not the best way to inform patients
of the reasons behind a certain treatment, while causal argumentation is ‘definitely not
an appropriate argument scheme for enhancing informed understanding.’ The authors
seem to mix up arguing and providing information—or at least they see arguing and
providing information as speech acts that are put forward simultaneously by means of
the same utterance. When a doctor is just informing the patient, however, and the
patient accepts the information presented to him, no argumentation is necessary, so that
there are no problems concerning argument schemes. On top of that, it is not very
likely that ‘informed consent’ obliges the doctor to explain every detail and technical
aspect of a diagnosis or treatment. For an adequate analysis ‘informed consent’ of
doctor–patient communication it would be good to have a better understanding of the
obligations of the doctor and the rights of the patients.
Argumentation becomes necessary when a patient expresses doubt about any of
the doctor’s statements. As Schulz and Rubinelli explain, the appropriateness of the
argument schemes that are used in the argumentation is largely an intersubjective
matter: the use of argument schemes is appropriate only if both parties in the
discussion are in agreement about the use of these schemes. There is no reason for
thinking that the choice of causal argumentation or argumentation based on
authority will be problematic in doctor–patient interaction. The analysis of actual
use of these argument schemes is a different matter. A further analysis of the context
may enable us to specify the criteria going with each of the argument schemes.
In conclusion, the problems that Schulz and Rubinelli mention can be seen as
constraints of an activity type that help us understand the strategic maneuvering that
goes on in this activity type. Characterizing these constraints enables the analyst to
understand the choices made by the doctor and by the patient in getting their respective
points across. It is clear that doctor–patient dialogues are structurally different from
other institutionalized interaction. It is certainly not the case, however, that the unequal
distribution of power and expertise make this type of interaction unsuitable for a
pragma-dialectical analysis. On the contrary, these characteristics, which define this
specific communicative action type and indicate the constraints, are of great help to us
when analyzing the strategic maneuvering that takes place in doctor–patient
interaction. Schultz and Rubinelli’s choice to focus on the concept of informed
consent opens up new venue for studying doctor–patient communication.
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